Document 198

Filed 05/12/2008

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TELEPHONE (415) 421-3111

Oase 3:07-cv-02486-WHA

I. INTRODUCTION

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Defendant Alta Bates Summit Medical Center ("ABSMC" or "the Hospital") hereby applies for an order *in limine* directing that Plaintiff Coyness L. Ennix ("Plaintiff"), his counsel, and witnesses be precluded from presenting evidence or argument in the presence of the jury concerning the testimony of any other physician, including but not limited to Jaikrishna Balkissoon, M.D., because such testimony amounts to improper and irrelevant opinions lacking foundation.

ABSMC anticipates that Plaintiff may seek to introduce evidence and/or testimony of other physicians, such as Dr. Balkissoon, who will speculate as to the alleged discriminatory nature of Plaintiff's peer review as well as their own alleged mistreatment during the peer review process. The motion is based upon the ground that such irrelevant and improper testimony is not admissible and must be excluded.

II. ARGUMENT

A. The Anticipated Testimony Of Other Physicians Regarding Plaintiff's Peer Review And/Or Their Alleged Mistreatment During The Peer Review Process Is Improper And Irrelevant.

The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that relevant evidence is admissible at trial. Relevant evidence is defined as:

[E]vidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.

Fed. R. Evid. 401.

Furthermore, Federal Rule of Evidence 701 defines the scope of permissible testimony of non-expert witnesses at trial. Rule 701 provides:

If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.

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In this case, Plaintiff has shown his propensity to rely on the testimony of other physicians who intend to provide evidence having no bearing on this case. For example, in support of Plaintiff's opposition to ABSMC's motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff presented irrelevant evidence of Physician H, Jaikrishna Balkissoon, M.D. In his declaration, Dr. Balkissoon discussed his first year of practice at Hills Physicians HMO in 1993; evidence clearly irrelevant to Plaintiff's claims. (3:18-20). Dr. Balkissoon also draws comparisons between his experience during the peer review process and that of Plaintiff's. Dr. Balkissoon's experience during the peer review process has no bearing on this case. The anticipated testimony of Balkissoon is entirely irrelevant and improper for the purpose for which it is offered; namely, to suggest that Plaintiff's peer review occurred because of race discrimination.

Furthermore, any anticipated testimony by other physicians offered by Plaintiff that refer to or make comparisons to Plaintiff's peer review and are not rationally based on the perception of the witness would be inadmissible hearsay. Such evidence should be excluded pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 802. All references by Dr. Balkissoon to Plaintiff's peer review are hearsay as such information must have been gained solely through discussions with Plaintiff or his counsel. Dr. Balkissoon did not participate in Plaintiff's peer review and had in fact resigned from the Summit Medical

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review process" (2:16-18).

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¹ Citations are to pages and line numbers of the Declaration of "Physician H" in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Other irrelevant and hearsay statements by Dr. Balkissoon include: "After my first year of practice, Hill Physicians HMO, . . . told me to stop taking breast cancer cases. . . (3:18-20). "Hill Physicians told me if I continued to take such cases, the HMO would drop me" (3:20-21). "When I' complained to Dr. Moorstein about this extensive review, he responded: 'What are you going to do about it?'" (5:23-24). "I learned from one of my former referring gynecologists that Dr. Steven Stanten informed him that I was no longer practicing due to 'trouble at the hospital'..." (8:1-4). "Additionally, I was informed that Dr. Lisa Bailey discussed my peer review with a medical staff officer at California Pacific Medical Center..." (8:4-6).

² "...I understand that many of the details of my peer review process are similar to those of Dr. Ennix's" (2:8-9). "Also, like Dr. Ennix, ABMSC targeted me for an extensive and protracted peer review process..." (2:12-13). "Like Dr. Ennix's case, ABSMC found an obscure outside peer reviewer who they paid to review cases of mine that they had selected, many of which had already been cleared of care issues through the normal

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27 28 Staff before Plaintiff's peer review process commenced.³ A "witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter." Fed. R. Evid. 602. These intended witnesses have no firsthand knowledge of Plaintiff's peer review or the circumstances surrounding the peer review of Plaintiff. The testimony of any other physician intending to offer evidence similar to that of Dr. Balkisoon is based exclusively on Plaintiff's self-serving and inaccurate account of events. As such, it should be excluded.

The Anticipated Testimony Of Other Physicians Regarding Plaintiff's B. Peer Review And/Or Their Alleged Mistreatment During The Peer Review Process Is Improper And Irrelevant.

Moreover, any arguable relevancy is substantially outweighed by Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which provides:

> Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

References to the peer review of any other physician would require a substantial expenditure of time and lead to undue confusion. The issues, medical procedures and the decision makers in Dr. Balkissoon's peer review differed substantially from those in Plaintiff's peer review. 4 Nevertheless, Plaintiff intends to offer evidence that Dr. Balkisson was also subjected to race discrimination regarding his peer review process. However, the Accusation filed by the Medical Board of California as to Dr. Balkisson relative to surgeries Balkissoon performed at Summit Medical Center from January 1998 through January 2002 contradicts Dr. Balkissoon's anticipated testimony.⁵ Dr. Balkissoon settled these charges by accepting a stayed license revocation, a three-vear probation and mandatory clinical education. As the State sets minimum standards for

See Dr. Balkissoon's peer review Exhibit F, page 7 to the 2/26/08 Hernaez Declaration. See Exh. F to the 2/26/08 Hernaez Declaration.

See Exhibit 2(A) to Defendant's Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN").

patient safety⁶, the State's action toward Dr. Balkissoon arising out of the practice that was peer reviewed by the Summit Medical Staff must be seen as negating entirely Dr. Balkissoon's conclusory claim of race discrimination.⁷ If Plaintiff is permitted to present such witnesses, separate mini-trials would first be required to determine the validity of their claims, which would confuse the issues pertinent to this case.

An examination of the Plaintiff's peer review in the course of this litigation has generated many depositions, the production of thousands of pages of documents and several discovery disputes. An additional examination of the peer review process of other physician's would require a substantial expenditure of time and lead to undue confusion.

III. CONCLUSION

Because the testimony of Dr. Balkissoon as well as any other physician concerning Plaintiff's peer review or their alleged mistreatment during the peer review process that Plaintiff intends to introduce is devoid of any evidentiary value, the court should grant ABSMC's motion.

DATED:

April 29, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

Attornevs for Defendant

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KAUFF MCCLAIN & MCGUIRE LLP

ALTA BATES SUMMIT MEDICAL

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⁶ See *Bonner v. Sisters of Providence Corp.*, 194 Cal. App. 3d 437, 444-446 (1987) (Decision of the Medical Board not relevant to mandamus proceedings concerning a Hospital's revocation of certain staff privileges because the hospital had a higher standard of care.)

⁷ Dr. Balkissoon did not exhaust administrative remedies concerning the actions of the ABSMC's Medical Staffs to terminate or otherwise restrict his privileges. Instead, he resigned from the Staffs. (Exhibit (2)(A) to Defendant's RJN, 3:9-16.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

REC'D MAY 0 9 2008

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Case No. C 07-2486 WHA

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO **DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN** LIMINE NO. 8 RE "OTHER PHYSICIANS"

Trial Date: June 2, 2008

Dept:

Ctrm. 9. 19th Floor

Judge:

Hon. William H. Alsup

For years, ABSMC has imposed discipline on doctors of color relatively more frequently and more harshly than their Caucasian peers. ABSMC's brand of racial discrimination is subtle and institution-wide, and it involves not just how harshly the MEC disciplines a doctor under review, but also who ABSMC targets for peer review or discipline at every level and what path that disciplinary process takes. In a system as specialized, extensive, complex, and secretive as hospital peer review, such institutional racial discrimination is hard to detect on an individual basis. And so far, ABSMC has gotten away with it in part because lay people have neither the desire nor the expertise to "second guess" a hospital's determination that a particular doctor requires discipline.

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case from any others, and so seeks to exclude other examples of ABSMC's racial discrimination, such as the testimony of Dr. Jaikrishna Balkissoon and "other physicians." But such evidence is relevant and admissible circumstantial evidence to prove racial discrimination in this case, and its use would not require "separate mini-trials" as ABSMC baldly claims. **ARGUMENT**

ABSMC knows this. And ABSMC knows that its strength lies in isolating Dr. Ennix's

"Particularly because employers now know better, direct evidence of employment discrimination is rare." Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disp, 292 F.3d 654, 662 (9th Cir. 2002). "It is well established that a . . . plaintiff may prove a defendant's discriminatory motive through circumstantial evidence alone." Beck v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 99, 506 F.3d 874, 883 (9th Cir. 2007). Such evidence may include examples of similar discriminatory treatment by the employer of other individuals in a protected class. See, e.g., id. at 884 (trial court considered evidence of gender discrimination against plaintiff's female coworker, finding it "strengthens the inference that [the union] intentionally discriminated on the basis of sex in handling the grievances of female members.")

DR. BALKISSOON'S TESTIMONY IS RELEVANT AND ADMISSIBLE. I.

Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FRE 401. Dr. Balkissoon would testify to his own experience as a doctor of color at ABSMC, not his opinions of Dr. Ennix's case. Dr. Balkissoon's account of events at ABSMC displays disparate treatment of him in comparison with his Caucasian colleagues, involves similar fact patterns and many of the same key decision-makers. As such, it tends to "strengthen the inference" that ABSMC intentionally discriminates on the basis of race in its review and discipline of physicians of color, such as Dr. Ennix. Beck, 506 F.3d at 884.

Dr. Balkissoon's testimony would include the following evidence, all of which is described in detail in Dr. Balkissoon's declaration, submitted under seal in opposition to summary judgment:

- He is a physician of color;
- He is a highly trained specialist in Surgical Oncology who sought to bring new techniques and treatments to ABSMC;
- ABSMC administration, including Drs. Moorstein and Steven Stanten, required Dr. Balkissoon to take emergency room call even though it interfered significantly with his developing, busy practice; ABSMC did not make the same request of Dr. Balkissoon's Caucasian partners;
- The Surgery Peer Review Committee ("SPRC") routinely targeted Dr. Balkissoon's challenging cases for review, but did not target similar cases of Dr. Balkissoon's Caucasian partners;
- The SPRC included no Surgical Oncologists (ergo no specialist qualified to review Dr.
 Balkissoon's challenging cases) and ABSMC administration refused to include a Surgical
 Oncologist on that committee;
- The SPRC, including Drs. Moorstein and Steven Stanten, decided to conduct a "100% focus review" of Dr. Balkissoon's cases, even though Dr. Balkissoon had no malpractice suits and his partners—both seasoned Surgical Oncologists (who were rarely if ever subject to peer reviews)—had assisted him on many cases and never found fault in his approach. The review encompassed 64 cases and included cases which had already been reviewed and cleared by the SPRC. The report concluded that there was nothing "of sufficient seriousness to warrant disciplinary action" and discontinued the review.
- Some months later, the SPRC targeted for peer review yet another case of Dr. Balkissoon's, a particularly challenging case he had presented at a weekly Tumor Board. ABSMC decided to send it for outside review. Although numerous highly qualified and well known Surgical Oncologists at Stanford and UCSF could have conducted the review, ABSMC chose for the outside review an entirely unknown doctor with relatively little experience in the field located in Salinas.

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- ABSMC also sent to the reviewer thirteen other cases, some of which had already been cleared in the "focus review" and others of which were as much as seven years old.
- The outside reviewer cleared the case Dr. Balkissoon had presented at the Tumor Board, but found care issues in some of the other cases. On the basis of that report, in 2003, the SPRC recommended his privileges be summarily suspended.

Dr. Balkissoon's story bears striking similarities with the facts of Dr. Ennix's case. For example, both cases involve:

- Highly successful physicians of color seeking to introduce new treatments at ABSMC;
- Higher scrutiny of the physician of color than his Caucasian colleagues;
- Internal peer review by doctors outside the specialty;
- Targeting cases for a second peer review after initial clearance of care issues;
- Many of the same doctors in positions of authority, specifically, Drs. Steven Stanten, Moorstein, Isenberg and Shaieb.
- A summary suspension based on an outside peer review report which found issues with cases that had already been cleared by internal peer review.

These facts speak for themselves. A jury could easily consider that Dr. Balkissoon's testimony "strengthens the inference" that ABSMC intentionally discriminates on the basis of race in its review and discipline of successful physicians of color, such as Dr. Ennix. Beck, 506 F.3d at 884. As such, Dr. Balkissoon's testimony, and that of "other physicians" of color subjected to discrimination at ABSMC, is relevant and admissible.

As for ABSMC's statement that the California Medical Board's actions against Dr. Balkissoon "must be seen as negating entirely" Dr. Balkissoon's claim of race discrimination, that question should be left for the jury to decide when it weighs Dr. Balkissoon's testimony. Finally, despite ABSMC's fears, Plaintiff has no need, or intention, of asking Dr. Balkissoon to opine regarding whether ABSMC discriminated again Dr. Ennix on the basis of race.

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II. THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF DR. BALKISSOON'S TESTIMONY OUTWEIGHS ANY PHANTOM CONFUSION OR EXPENDITURE OF TIME.

ABSMC asserts that admitting evidence of any other instances of racially discriminatory peer reviews would cause confusion and require a substantial expenditure of time, and that such risks outweigh any probative value. ABSMC's argument is self-serving. The probative value of evidence of similar instances of racial discrimination by ABSMC is high, especially in light of the difficulty in proving racial motive in a specialized, complex system like medical peer review, a system inherently suited for manipulation. Circumstantial evidence of this kind is permitted and indeed necessary to prove disparate treatment cases. Aragon, 292 F.3d at 662. Further, its use will not require "separate mini-trials to determine the validity of their claims." ABSMC cited no cases, as Plaintiff knows of none, which require a "separate mini-trial" to screen witnesses to racial discrimination to determine whether their claims would be "valid." Certainly, Beck did not appear to require a "separate mini-trial" for that plaintiff's female co-worker who alleged similar discrimination to the plaintiff in that case. Beck, 506 F.3d at 884. Equally, Dr. Balkissoon would testify to the ways in which ABSMC treated him differently than his Caucasian peers. The issue would not be the complex question of whether Dr. Balkissoon is a good doctor, an issue that would require its own trial. Again, whether and how much to credit Dr. Balkissoon's testimony, or that of any other witness testifying to disparate treatment at ABSMC, should be left to the jury.

CONCLUSION

Because the testimony of Dr. Balkissoon and other ABSMC physicians is probative and relevant as to whether ABSMC subtly discriminates against physicians of color in the peer review process, it must be admitted.

Dated: May 9, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

MOSCONE, EMBLIDGE & QUADRA, LLP

By: Rachel I Sat

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